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ThlTRODUCI'ION 
Several najor negotiations to be conducted durinq the next few years will 
seek to evolve a  modified structure of economic relations among  nations.  The 
economic  system established at the end of World War  II has undergone change  1 
and new  elements  1  nore in confonni  ty with the situation, needs and goals of the 
1970's and 1980's are being worked out.  An international economic and rronetary 
system which WJrks well is essential roth for the continued growth and pros:perity 
of the industrialized countries and for the economic takeoff and progress of 
the developing countries. 
The  relationship between the European Community  and the United States is 
a  vital element in international economic relations.  But that relationship is 
constantly evolving as each party redefines roth its own  p::>litical identity and 
its own  role in world affairs.  As Commission President Francois-xavier Ortoli 
recently said:  "Without a  doubt the objective facts have changed;  the relations 
between the United States and Europe are no longer and can no longer be what 
they were.  But there exists a  very strong inherent necessity in favor of an 
ample and detennined collaboration between our two entities.  " 
It is with a  view to contributing to a  nore thorough understanding of the 
issues being discussed between the United States and the European Comnuni ty in 
this period of change that this note-- has been prepared.  The method chosen in 
this paper is a  factual comparative presentation.  The note is specifically 
limited to matters within the direct competence of the European Conmuni ty and in 
particular that of the Corrmission. 
1
This note is an upc;lated version of the note  "The European Corrrnunity  and the 
United States:  1972 1 "  published by the Spokesman's Group in June 1972. 2  -
I.  GENERAL  TRADE  DEVEIDPMENT 
Since the establishment of the European Corrmunity in 1958,  trade between the 
Ccmnunity and the United States has developed at a  brisk pace to the benefit 
of both trading partners.  The rising standard of living in the vast outlet of 
the European Cormon Market and the diminishing barriers to trade within Europe 
have rra.de  this an attractive outlet for Arrerican products.  Similarly there has 
been substantial growth in Camruni  ty exports to the United States. 
An additional factor behind the spectacular growth of American exports 
to the Euroepan Camruni  ty is the low level of the C"'..orrrnuni ty'  s  cormon external 
tariff.  The Comnunity' s  comrron  tariff was established, with a  few minor exceptions, 
as an average of the previously existing tariffs of the six ~  States.  This 
resulted in a  low and rrore consistent tariff for the Commmity as a  wtlole.  Since 
then this tariff has further been lowered as a  result of the Kennedy 'Round 
negotiations. 
Only 13.1 per cent of European Econanic Corrmunity  (EF....C)  tariffs on industrial 
goods exceed 10 per cent and 2. 4  per cent e..xceed  15 per cent, while 38.3 per cent 
of American industrial tariffs exceed 10 per cent and  23.7 per cent  e~ceed 15 per 
cent. 
EEC(Six) 
United States 
Japan 
2 
Average Tariffs on Industrial Products  2 
and Raw  Materials  (percentages) 
Raw  Materials  Semi-Manu£.  Finished  All Industrial 
Products  Products  Products 
0.6  6.2  8.7  6.0 
3.8  8.3  8.1  7.1 
5.5  9.33  12.0  9.7 
Source:  "Basic Ibctiitentation for the Tariff Study,"  General Agreerrent on 
3ariff~;and Trade  (GATT)  1971. 
A reduction of about Tho to three  "rx:>ints"  catre  into effect at the end of 1972 
(i.e., a  reduction of about  20  per cent for 1,865 products).  There vlas  another 
less intpartant reduction in April 1973 on 102 products. 3  -
As a  result of the enlargerrent of the Co:rrmunity  through the entry of 
Demnark,  Ireland,  and the United Kingdom,  the latter cormtries will adopt the 
camon external tariff in four stages between January 1, 1974,  and July 1,  1977. 
This will result in many  instances in a  further lowering of tariffs since the 
British and Irish tariffs are generally SOIIEVlhat  higher than the camon external 
tariff.  The British tariff on industrial products for example,  averages 7. 6 
per cent  1  corrpared with the Ccmnuni  ty  •  s  6. 0  per cent. 
Since 1958 the Community has been a  dynamic  fast-growing market for 
Arrerican exports.  In 1958 the Ccmnunity i.rrq;x:>rted  2.  808 billion nnits of account  4 
(UA)  worth of goods  from the United States, while exporting UA  1.664 billion 
there.  In 1912 the Connnmity of Six imported UA  8.585 billion from the United 
States and exported goods to the value of UA  8. 321 billion to the United States. 
For the enlarged Corrmunity the corresponding figures in 1972 were irrports of UA 
11.900 billion from the United States and exports of UA  11.713 billion to the 
United States. 
The rate of growth of American exports towards the Camn.mity has been 
faster than the increase of Arrerican  ex:p::>rts  to many other areas of the world. 
According to American statistics  1  from 1962 to 1972 AITerican exports to the 
Corrrnrn1ity  grew by 143 per cent.  During the same J?erioo,  Arrerican exports rose 
by 127 per cent to all other areas and by 132 per cent towards the original 
seven corn1tries of the Et.rropean Free Trade Association  (EFTA). 
4
The Unit of Account  (hereafter UA)  is the accounting instrur'rent used by the 
European Conmunities.  It has a  value to 0.88867088  grams fine gold or the 
value of the dollar prior to August 15,  1971. 4 
Since 1958  the Carmu.nity has run a  continuous and substantial trade 
deficit with the United States,  averaging UA  1.  569  billion armually,  (see Annex, 
Table 1).  In 1972 the trade deficit was  UA  264 million for the Six and UA 
187 million for the Nine. 5  Comnunity-American trade in 1972 was affected by 
several temporary phenarena that raised Arrerican irnfx:>rts  from Europe while 
lowering Arrerican exports to Europe.  The first was the aftemath of the 
December  1971 Smithsonian agreeJD211t.  The  imnediate effect of a  devaluation 
is to increase the value of jroports of the devaluing country since the cost of 
gcx:xis  already ordered or shipped is raised by the value of the devaluation. 
Another factor was that European and Arrerican economies  were out of cycle with 
each other.  The AJrerican economy was l:oaning in 1972 with a  real growth of 
6. 5  per cent,  thus pulling in large llnports from Europe and elsewhere and 
keeping :potential exports at horre.  The European economies,  on the other hand, 
were suffering low growth,  3. 7  per cent on average in the Corrmunity,  which 
tended to restrain linports. 
II.  AGRICULTURE 
The Conmuni ty  •  s  agricultural :policy has often been criticized as bejng hannful 
to American interests.  A review of the developnent of Arrerican agricultural 
6  exports to the Ccmnunity,  however,  does not sup:port such charges. 
5According to Alrerican trade statistics, the Cormnmity in 1972 had a  surplus 
in trade with the United States.  The disparity was due primarily to differing 
methods of statistical evaluations.  The United States and Canada are the only 
countries which calculate imports  "free on lx>ard"  (FOB)  rather than  "cost, 
insurance,  freight"  (CIF).  The  Carmunity and rrost countries calculate exoorts 
FOB  and linports CIF.  ~ 
6The  source for all statistics used here .is the US  Department of Corrmerce. - 5  -
The European Ccrmrunity is the rrost .irrq;:x)rtant market for American 
agricultural exports,  and since its establishment  ti~e Community's share of total 
American agricultural e2q)Orts has actually increased slightly.  In 1958  the FEC 
accounted for 21.3 per cent of total American agricultural export sales,  in 
1964  for 21.7 per cent,  and in 1972  for 23  per cent.  In 1964,  the last full 
year before the introduction of the corrrnon  agricultural :r:olicy,  US  agricultural 
exports,  excluding cotton,  arrounted to $1.227 billion.  By 1972  these had risen 
to $/. 049  billion.  During these eight years Americai! agricultural eX}?Jrts have 
increased 67  pe_r  cent to the Corrmunity  while exports to the rest of the v..-orld 
increased by only 55  per centr  even including the spectacular sales of cereals 
to U1e  Soviet Union in 1972  .. 
:rhe growth of American agricultural exports to the Comnillli ty of Six was 
greater tl1a11  that towards the three new  Conmuni ty members,  which up to no'ii'7 
applied different agricultural pJlicies.  Taking the development betv-.-reen  a 
representative period prior to the introduction of the comm::m  agricultural rx:>licy 
{1961-63)  and a  recent reference pericxl  (1969-71), .Arrerican  agricultural exp:Jrts 
increased by 51  per cent to the Six,  buy only by 11  per cent to the United 
Kingdom,  by 43 per cent to Denmark,  and by 47  per cent to Ireland. 
rrhere have,  of course,  been shifts in the prcxluct mix of Comnunity 
agriculural imports from the United  Sta~es.  Same  products have advanced faster 
than others.  The increase of corn and wheat linp)rts,  for example,  has been 
7 
slower than the phenanenal growth in .i_rrq;x)rts  of soybeans and  soy products. 
This is prirnaril  y  due to changing livestock feeding techniques,  with a  much 
greater use of high protein soy products and a  declining use of such prcxlucts 
as corn. 
7 
See also the last paragraph of page  7. 6 
Carrnunity agricultural exports to the United States,  on the other hand, 
are much  sma.ller than those in the reverse direction.  In 1958 the Cormruni ty 
exported  $205 million worth of fann products to the United States;  by 1972 these 
e}{{X)rts  had risen to $531 million.  Many  of the :rrost  lin:pJrtant Comnunity 
agricultural exports,  such as dairy products,  are subject to quantitative 
restrictions in t:he  United States, which limits their expJrt possibilities. 
With .irrports of $2.049 billion and exports of $531 million,  the Corrrnunity  in 
1972  thus had an agricultural trade deficit of $1.518 billion with t:he  United 
States. 
All industrialized conn  tries have special agricultural programs sui  ted 
to thier structures and climate which aim at integrating this .irrport:ant sector 
into the structure of the whole economy after reorganizing it as appropriate 
and guaranteeing agricultural v.orkers a  r12asonable  income in comparison with 
industrial workers.  For the Corrmunity,  agriculture is especially important, 
since some  10.5 per cent of the enlarged Corrmuni ty'  s  active population is 
employed in agriculture~ in certain regions of Southern Italy over 50 per cent 
of workers are on the land.  Agriculture accounts for approximately  4  per cent 
of the active PJpulation of the United. States. 
Trade in agricultural products has consequently always been nore 
restricted than trade in industrial products,  and no industrial cow1try allows 
free and unhindered agricultural cornnerce.  The  American Government,  for example, 
guarantees its farrrers'  incorre and protects its agriculture by means of the 
income  support system and quantitative import restrictions on many  J?roducts. 
The United States maintains quotas or asks for  "voluntary" restrain-t by the 
eXfX)rting countries on 16 products,  including wheat,  sugar,  cotton,  and rrost 
milk products.  The  restrictions are applied under a  1955 derogation clause in 
the GATr  rules,  which allows the United States to restrict :imp:::>rts  of nost 
agricultural products.  According to GATr  studies, nearly one half of .1\roorican 
agricultural porduction is shielded through these quantitative restr:-ictions. 7 
The  Cormn.mi ty uses a  different system to guarantee agricultural inCCJITe.  For 
sane important carmodities such as wheat,  corn,  and milk products,  fa.nrers 
are given a  guaranteed min.iroum price and a  variable levy is applied to i.:rrq_:orts. 
Fixed import duties are applied to many other corrm::x:lities,  such as mutton, 
tobacco,  and fruits and vegetables.  All the products covered by the cormon 
agricultural p:>licy,  or  95  per cent of total agricultural production,  are 
free of quantitative restrictions.  The only exception is fruit and vegetables 
which at certain times of the year are subject to tilretables.  ~reover, over 
40  per cent of Arrerican agricultural exports to the Cormn.mi ty such as soybeans 
and soy products which last year accounted for nearly $800 million in sales in 
the Six and $1. 000  billion in the Nine,  today enter the Comm.mi ty free of any 
tariff or restriction.  On  the other hand,  on June 27,  1973,  the US  Depart::rrent 
of Carrmerce  announced a  total embargo on exports of soybeans and soybean oil cakes 
and meal  and on July 3  announced that exp:>rt licenses v.:ould  be issued covering 
50 per cent of outstanding contracts for soybeans and 40  per cent  for soybean 
oil cake and meal.  On  September 7,  the Department of ~ce  announced the 
liberalization of exoort restrictions on all the aaricultural commodities affected. 
More  important than the rrethod of income supoort for aqricul  tural 
workers,  however,  is the result.  An  independent study in 1971 estimated that 
the Corrmunity  supp:>rted each fa.nrer to the tune of sane  $860  annually.  The 
8 
corresJX)nding figure for the United States was  $1,320. 
European agriculture,  finally,  must be viewed in its social context. 
Although the "green revolution" has reached Europe in recent years,  raising 
productivity in some  areas and for some  prcrlucts to levels comparable to those 
in the United States and Canada,  European agriculture is by and large still 
backward by international standards.  Too  many  workers are still tilling small 
inefficient farms that are incorrpatible with today' s  rro:::1em,  rrechanized agriculture. 
8"Conparaison entre le soutien accorde a  !'agriculture aux Etats-Unis et dans 
la Cbnrnunaute"  by Professors G.  Vandewalle and 1'7.  f~eusen. 8 
The average size of a  farm in the enlarged Camtunity in 1972 was an 
estimated 1,500 acres;  the average American farm last year was 15,420 acres. 
The  Corrmuni ty proportionate!  y  has nearly three tir.res rrore of its working 
population on the fam than the United States.  There already exists a  clear 
trend within the Carmumi ty,  however,  towards larger agricultural holdings and 
a  declining aaricultural population.  In 1950,  20 million persons we.re  ~loyed 
on the fam in the Six;  by 1970 this figm:·e  had dropped to 10 million,  and it 
is estimated that by 1980 it will be only 5 million.  As  a  share of the total 
active population,  fann ~rkers in the Six declined from  28  per cent in 1950 to 
13  per cent in 1970 and will fonn an estimated 6  per cent in 1980. 
The Community's goals in agriculture according to Article 39 of the EEC 
Treaty are to increase agricultural productivity,  ensure a  fair standard of 
living for the agricultural community,  stabilize markets,  and assure both that 
s~pplies are available and that they reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
Europe's social problem in agriculture should not be solved by drastic 
measures but only through social evolution.  In March 1970 the EEC  Council of 
Ministers adopted the first directives under the so-called "Mansholt Plan"  for 
the m:xlernization of European agriculture.  These directives call for the spending 
of UA  830 million fran Camrunity funds over the next five years to encourage the 
forrration of larger farms  and to give income  support to fanrers wishing to leave 
the land.  A resolution to help farmers  at: a  geographical disadvantage,  such as 
in hill regions,  was approved last May by the Tvlinisters. 9 
It was  likewise with a  view to improving the operation of the co:rmon 
agricultural policy that the Council decided that it would very shortly review 
certain of its rules,  on proposals from the Commission,  without questioning 
either the principles or the machinery of the r:olicy.  Even recently it was 
still found that despite a  difficult world market situation the common  agricultural 
policy was  helping to stabilize markets and to secure Community  supplies~ it 
protects consumers against the sudden impact of sharp world market price increases 
and guarantees its food supplies.9 
On  the other hand,  the Ccmnuni ty has a  duty not only to maintain guaranteed 
supplies while at the  same  time assuring its farmers  ·  a  fair income but also 
to rraintain a  state of equilibrium between its industrial areas and its  farming 
areas by means of general economic policy reflecting the legitimate aspirations 
of the whole of the population in the field of the environrrent and the quality 
of life. 
As  Comnissioner Petrus J. I.ardinois recently said,  the comron agricultural 
policy must also be  implemented as a  part of a  world agricultural :r;x:>licy, 
contribute towards stabilizing markets in the main commodities through international 
agreements,  and thus enable the  gr~1ing food  requirements of the world' s  peoples 
to be met. 
III.  NONTARIFF  BARRIERS 
The post-war rrovement of trade liberalization has been successful in lowering 
high walls of industrial tariff protection built during the 1920's and 1930's. 
As  industrial tariffs have corre  down,  though,  nontariff barriers to trade such 
as licensing systems,  customs valuation and labeling,  and packaging standards 
have taken on greater significance. 
9The  current V>.Drld  market price of cornrron  wheat is 35  per cent higher t.han the 
Community  price, while the price of durum wheat is double the Cormmmity  price. 10 
The  GA'IT  has drawn up an inventory of rrore than 800  nontariff measures. 
This GA'IT  inventory shows  that all countries have extensive non  tariff barriers. 
The  United States is anong the countries against which the rrost complaints have 
been leveled.  One  of the major tasks of 1:he  new  round of multilateral trade 
negotiations will be to seek a  reciprocal diSITEntling of nontariff barriers by 
all conntries  (see also Section VIII) . 
Economic  integration within the Gannon Market has already decreased the 
number  and rragnitude of nontariff barriers previously erected by  thE~ Six.  Since 
1958  such technical barriers to trade as national subsidies to shipl)uilding,  the 
Italian statistical tax and various national and teclmical norms  and standards 
have been hanronized,  reduced,  or rerroved at Community  level as pari: of the 
process of establishing a  truly corrmJn  market arrong  the Six.  This action was 
taken to facilitate intra-Corrmunity trade,  but the effects are also beneficial 
for exports from all non-rnember countries. 
The  Comnuni ty'  s  tax system based on value added tax  (VAT)  has  sorretimes 
been misunderstood and regarded as a  nontariff barrier.  The  VAT  has been adopted 
by the Corrmuni ty as the :rrost appropriate :means  of ha.rrronizing the existing 
disparate European systems of indirect taxes,  many of which had feat.ures which 
might have laid them ope.n  to being called non  tariff barriers.  At the present 
time the Member States apply differing VAT  rates,  but eventually these will l:::e 
harrronized.  The  VAT,  like the sales tax ·which is used in 46  of the 50  American 
states,  is an indirect tax.  The  trading rules of GATr  permit  borde:~::- adjusbnents 
on incjirect taxes ·so that foreign and domestic products compete on  cll1  equal 
footing.  Thus both locally produced and  i.mp:::>rted  goods are equally taxed when 
sold within the state or country,  and taxes need not be paid on goods exported 
outside the state or country.  This applies equally for the Arrerican state sales 
taxes,  such as the 6  per cent tax of Pennsylvania,  and for the VAT. 11 
:r.breover,  both the GmT and the Organization for Economic  Cooperation 
and Developrent  (O:OCO)  have made  extensive enquiries into the trade effects of 
the VAT,  which is now  also used by rrany non-conmunity countries.  Both organizations 
concluded that the tax was neutral and did not distort competition between 
darestic and .iJntx:>rted  goods. 
1.  Quantitative Restrictions 
Quantitative restrictions, which set absolute limits on the arrount of an item 
that can be .iJntx:>rtedl  are generally much  rrore hamful to free trade than tariffs. 
Quantitative restrictions can take place either via quotas or via so-called 
"voluntary self-limitations" whereby the exporting country restricts the level 
of its exports.  In recent years Community  Member States have been steadily 
al:olishing their quantitative restriction.  OVer  the pa.st five years the Commmity 
Member  States decreased the number of their quotas according to the following 
table.  In both sets of figures  there is extensive duplication since the sane 
product may be subject to restriction ii1  rrore than one Member  State. 
Benelux 
France 
Gernany 
Italy 
June 1,  1968 
56 
113 
59 
129 
June 1,  1973 
31 
64 
30 
58 
In the United States  1  on the contrary  1  the trend has been exactly the 
opposite.  The United States has been making increasing use of quantitative 
restriction, especially through the use of "voluntary self-limitations" and now 
has rrore  than any Corrmuni ty Member  State.  In 196  3  the United Staes had only 
seven quantitative restrictions ; in 1971 it had 67,  and in March  1973 it had 77. 12 
2.  Valuation Practices 
The  ".Arrerican Sellina Price" is a  methcx:l.  of customs valuation used by the 
United States on such benzenoid  chemicals and their derivatives like dyes, 
pesticides,  ph.a..rrmceuticals,  and plastics.  Under this practice, duties are 
established not according to the value of the product itself but according to 
the price of the same  prcx:l.uct manufactured in the United States; this 
eliminates any competitive advantage the irrport might have.  Although rerroval 
of the Airerican Selling Pricy was part of the supplementary Chemicals Agreement 
nego·tiated in the Kennedy Round,  the American Congress never took 1:he  necessary 
action to repeal the measure.  In addition to the American Selling Price, other 
methods of customs valuation such as those applied under the "Final List" are 
extremely c()J'fq?licated  and create rmcertainty.  'Ihe United States is likewise 
one of the few countries which does not apply the standard interna1:ionally 
accepted tariff nonenclature,  which can also corrq;>licate  and hinder trade. 
3.  Government Procurement 
Through a  variety of state and national Jrteasures,  government purchases of 
AT:rerican-prcx:l.uced  rather than irrported goods are encouraged.  The  Buy American 
Act of 1933 requires that national goverrnnent purchases must be Am=rican-made 
products unless the Arrerican equipnent is either not available or costs 6  per 
cent  (in some  areas 12 per cent)  :rrore  than the foreign-made product:.  The 
Arrer.ican  DefensE~ Depart:Jrent derrands that foreign products must cost.  50  per cent 
less than the American prcxluct if they are to be purchased.  The  Depart:Jrent 
also maintains a  long list of products,  including food,  clothing,  special 
steels and products made  from them,  which cannot be purchased at any price if 
they are foreign.  Nearly half of the American states have Buy  American Acts. - 13  -
4.  .Mministrati  ve Obstacles 
A wide variety of administrative controls likewise :i.rrpede  or corrplicate 
Co.rrmuni ty exports towards the United States.  No  foreign-made vessel,  for 
example,  can ship goods between ports along the American coast.  Another 
Arrerican Act requires "marks of origin" such as  "Made  in Italy" or "Made  in 
Ja:pan"  on all products.  This conplicates production and  can also result in 
discrimination by buyers against foreign goods.  The United States furthemore 
does not confonn to the accepted international rules on durcping.  Although 
the United States took part in drawing up the international anti  -durrping code 
during the Kennedy Round,  it has never applied the criteria of the code. 
Special Arrerican rules and their excessive use can have the effect of becoming 
a  barrier to trade.  From July 1,  1971,  to June 30,  1972,  for example,  the 
United States,  applying its own  rules opened 39  anti-durcping cases and levied 
special d'llrrq?ing  duties in 16 cases.  During the sane period the Conmuni ty, 
applying the stricter international code,  opened only 11 cases and applied 
no durcping duties.  In addition,  national escape clauses and countervailing 
duties are being applied in the United States.  In a  certain number of escape 
clause procedures,  tariff concessions made in the Kennedy Round are being 
nullified lest they lead to growing import competition. 
5.  D:>rrestic International Sales Corporations  {DISC) 
In December  1971 the American Congress passed an Act permitting the 
establishment of DISC  con:pa.nies,  which are allowed to defer payments of 50  per 
cent of the tax on their export profits.  The  50 per cent tax deferrrent  th~1 
becomes tax exerrption since it is never taxed as long as the profits are not 
distributed to stockholders but instead are reinvested for export developnent. 
Same  3,000 DISC  companies have been established since December 1971. 14  -
The Ccmnunity,  Canada,  and  (before it joined the Cornrmmity)  the United 
Kinqdan have all protested to the United States that the DISC  tax arrangement 
is an export subsidy designed to give American companies a  carpetitive 
advantage.  They will be able to reduce prices since they are not carrying 
the normal tax load.  Export subsidies are in violation of the GATI'  and the 
Ccmnuni  ty has initiated proceedings nnder GA'IT  rules concerning the DISC. 
IV·  AMERICAN'  INVES'IMENrS  IN EUROPE 
American  invest:Irent in EUrOpe  today is an imp::>rtant element in the corrplex 
kaleidoscope of Atlantic and nonetary relations. 
In 1958 Anerican invesi::Irent in the Ccmnunity of Six totaled $1.908 
billion; at the end of 1971  it stocrl at $13.574 billion.  In addition to this 
there was also $8.941 billion of Alrerican investment in the United Kingdom. 
Total Alrerican investment in the Nine at the end of 1971  was  $23.087 billion. 
All figures given here are based on book value;  real or replacerrent value 
w::>uld  be three to four t.irres greater.  Such figures also take into acconnt 
only investments by Arrerican finns directly fran the United States and do not 
include investments by .A.Irerican  holding companies located,  for example,  in 
Switzer  land,  Luxemrourg,  or the Ba.hama.s. 
Since its  establishement the Community  has been one of the fastest 
growing regions for Airerican direct investment.  'Ihe perspectives of a  large, 
rrore unified and affluent market encouraged rrany ArcErican carpanies to 
establish rranufacturing plants in Europe.  In 1958  invest::rrent in the Ccmnunity · 
comprised only 7  per cent of total Arrerican invest:Irent abroad.  By 1971 the 
Corrmunity proportion had risen to 15.8 per cent,  and 26.8 per cent of Airerican 
invesbnent abroad in 1971  was in the Camrnunity of Nine.  The largest part of 
American investment in Europe,  in contrast to that in nost other areas,  is 
in rranufacturing industries rather than in petroleum or mining. 15 
The  volume of direct An:Erican  invest:n:ent is perhaps rrore accurately 
seen from the annual expenditure of An:Erican companies on plant and equipment. 
Capital expenditure oornprises capital transferred from the United States, 
capital raised in European :rroney markets,  and reinvested earnings.  Annual 
capital expenditures in the Six by Arrerican firms totaled $420 million in 1958 
but is likely to be $3.500 billion for 1973.  Capital expenditure in Britain is 
expected to be $1.600 billion in 1973. 
This Arrer  ican direct invest:n:ent  has had an imp::>rtant  impact on trade 
relations between the Commmity and the United States.  As the multinational 
American corporations themselves often state,  they have built plants in 
Europe in order to be closer to the narkets to which they are selling.  The 
United States,  to take but one example,  exfX)rts relatively few  autorrobiles to 
Europe.  This is not due to European barriers against Arrerican cars but 
primarily because the subsidiaries of the major Alrerican autarobile finns are 
manufacturing cars in Europe made  for European specifications and tastes. 
Today rrore and rrore American products,  whether canputers or detergents,  which 
might have been fonnerly manufactured in the United States and then exp:>rted 
to Europe are now  being produced in Europe itself. 
This developnent,  of course,  has had an impact on the level of 
Airerican expJrts to Europe.  It is impossible to ascertain the exact arrount of 
American ex:r:orts which are displaced by production in Europe.  It is estimated, 
however,  that today sales of Arrerican manufacturing subsidiaries in the 
Commmity are so:rre  three to four tines greater than the value of American 
manufactured exports.  US  direct investrrents in Europe have,  however, 
also generated American exports,  especially of capital equipment,  from the 
rrother company  in the United States to the Corrmuni  ty-based subsidiary.  'Ihe 
output of these subsidiaries is however entirely produced for markets in 
Europe. 16 
This phenomenon is in contrast to that in other parts of the "\o\Orld, 
where output is often re-exported back to the United States. 
10 
Camruni  ty direst investment in the~ Unites States has always been nn.1ch 
smaller than American invesbrent in Eurqpe.  The  lxx:>k  value of Corrmuni ty 
investment in the United  States in 1960 was  $1. 446  billion and at the end of 
1971 Y.as  $3.757 billion plus an additional $4.43.5 billion of investment in 
Great Britain. 
V.  PREFERENTIAL  AGREEMENTS 
The  European Community is a  new unit in international trade.  Yet at the sa:rre 
time the Comnuni  t.y has inherited the economic and the political ties of its 
~r  States.  Part of this inheritance consists of the close trading links 
with many  developing countries which are jn rrany cases still vitally dependent 
on Corrmuni ty markets as an expc>rt out:let for their raw materials and 
agricultural products.  The Cammmi ty has constantly received requests from 
these developing countries to grant t:heir exports special treat:rrent..  ~rhe 
Corrmunity  and its Member States thus have a  particular responsibility ·to 
ensure the economic stability and development of these countries,  some of which 
are anong the least developed in the w::>r ld. 
This responsibility has found its expression through a  policy of 
cooperation and development and  Y.~as  qiven practical form in the first and 
second Yaounde  Conventions conclud.ed with 17 African States and Madagascar, 
joined in 1972  by Mauritius.  These agreerrents,  ~Nhich rrake  important provisions 
for develop:riEI1t  and also establish arrangements based on the concept. of free-
trade without,  however,  involving the autorratic sJrant of preferential treatrrent 
for Corrmunity  exp::>rts.  Furthenrore,  the 1969 Arusha Convention established a 
similar association between the Carmunity and Kenya,  Uganda,  and Tanzania. 
10The  repatriation of profits from American investment abroad,  especially in 
Europe,  has in rece!\t years becorre  an important factor in the American balance 
of payments.  For a  full treatnent of this see Section VII below. 17 
Under Protocol 22  of the Treaty of Accession,  the Conmunity agreed to 
offer the 21  independent Corrnonwealth countries, which are at a  stage of 
econanic develo:prent similar to that of the original 18,  a  choice of trading 
arrangements including the sarre  type of arrangement with the enlarged 
Conmunity as that already enjoyed by the original 18 countries.  This offer 
was  subsequently extended to a  certain number of developing countries south 
of the Sahara. 
In October 1973 the Corrmission began negotiations with 42  developing 
countries,  some  associated and satE not. 
The Conmuni ty has also signed a  series of agreenents with rrost of the 
countries in the ~i  terranean basin.  The  purpJse of these agreements,  rrost 
of which are currently being renewed,  was to safeguard the traditional 
economic and ccrnrrercial equilibrium in this area vvhere,  once again, Member 
States  of the Community  had close historical and economic ties. 
In the case of SOOE of the countries on the northern shore of the 
Mediterranean,  these agreerrents are aimed at bringing the economies of the 
countries up to the level of development that will enable them eventually 
to join the Conmuni ty as full nembers,  provided their political systems are 
ce>npatible with denocratic principles.  For all the developing countries 
of the Mediterranean basin the Corrmunity rrarket is vitally important.  They 
all send over half of their total exports to the enlarged Conmuni ty,  and for 
sorre  countries such as Algeria  (80  per cent)  and MJrocco  (70  per cent)  the 
figure is even higher.  Especially for such agricultural exports as tomatoes, 
citrus fruit and wine,  the enlarged Corrmmi ty is their main custorrer. 18 
In addi  tion1  the enlargerrent of the Cormn.mity made it necessaxy for 
the Nine to cone to sone special arrangenents with the EFTA  members ·which 
were not joining the Camnmity.  Since 1960 EFTA  had established an industrial 
free trade area arrong its mernbers.  The entry of Britain and Denmark  into 
the Connn.mi ty  1  however  1  would have necessitated the re-establishment. of tariff 
barriers between those countries and their farner EFTA  partners  1  a  developrrent 
which would have gone against the whole post-war novement towards freer 
w:>rld  trade.  The  rerraining EFTA  countries, in addition,  did fran 40  per cent 
to 60  per cent of their trade with the enlarged camrunity.  During 1972 and 
early 1973 industrial free trade agreemen1:s were therefore negotiated with 
the remaining seven EFTA  countries.  These will progressively establish free 
trade for industrial products between each country and the Corrmuni ty. 
The  Conmission has stated that it has no intention of proposing 
preferential agreerrents with any other countries.  Sir Christopher Soames  said 
in April,  "I Imlst also make it clear that the Corrnrunity does not seek to 
extend its p::>licy of association and  pref~=rential trade agreerrents beyond the 
limits which history and close geographica.l links have made  necessa.Iy.  In fact, 
I  say quite categorically that the Com:nission,  having considered this question, 
has no intention of proposing any additional agreertEnts of a  preferential 
kind with countries which lie outside Africa or the r.Edi  terranean basin. " 
One  particular aspect of these preferential agreerrents has recently drawn 
criticism -- the so-called "reverse preferences." 
In reality, critic  ism based on this notion proceeds  from a  nus-
understanding,  provided by the reference to the free-trade  arrangem:~nts a:i.rred 
at by international trade agreements  (GATr  agreements).  The  reference was 
necessary in order to protect the parties from legal criticisms in 1:he  light of 
GATr  rules. 19 
In its Memorandum of April 1974 the Commission explicitly stated that 
it vvould  not ask for reverse preferences fran its future p:rrtners.  It remains 
clear that the countries already associated will rna.intain the concessions 
crranted to the Camruni  ty (certain countries,  such as Zaire and Togo,  have 
offered none).  It is W)rth remanbering the scale of the trade involved: 
in 1971 the United States exported goods worth $950 million to the associated 
or associable countries  (including the Maghreb countries),  $600 million to 
South Africa alone and  $43 million to all other countries;  in other words 
Conmuni ty association arrangerrents will  affect at worst 2  per cent of Arterican 
exports. 
The Corrmuni ty'  s  primary goal with the preferential agreerrents is to 
ensure that its market remains open to the developing countries,  whose 
livelihood de:pends  so heavily on it.  The preferential agreerrents are the best 
TIEthod  that has so far been found to accorrplish that goal. 
VI.  JAPANESE-cOMMUNITY  TRADE  RElATIONS 
Trade relations between the United States,  Japan and the European Community 
are closely interrelated.  The bilateral relations between any tv..o  of them 
are of importance for all three  and for the well-being of world trade as a 
whole.  American officials have complained that the Community is protectionist 
against Japanese products and that this situation has forced the Japanese 
to concentrate m:>re  heavily on the American narket.  This argwnent is not 
confirmed by the facts. 20 
In recent years Japanese exports 1:o  the Corrmunity have been increasing 
at a  rapid pace.  In 1958 the Community exported UA  139 million VJC>rt:h  of gocrls 
to Japan and  irrp:>rted UA  117 million frorn Japan.  In 1972 the Community of Six 
irrported UA  1.  876 billion fran Japan and exported UA  1.  080 billion to that 
country.  Corresponding figures for the enlarged Cormtunity in 1972 v~e irrports 
of UA 2. 752 billion and exr:orts of UA  1.544 billion.  In 1971 Corrnrunity 
impJrts from Japan were up 25 per cent over the previous year,  and .in 1972 they 
were up an additional 22  per cent over 1971.  It is clear that Japanese exporters, 
finding the American market rrore restricted to them and their expor1: potential 
there exhausted,  have turned increasingly toward the European market  .. 
Before 1967 the Camrunity had regular trade surpluses with ~Japan, but since 
then it has had an annually increasing deficit.  In proportion to the anount 
of trade,  this deficit is even higher than the Arrerican trade deficit with 
Japan.  In 1972 the Corrmunity of Six had a  trade deficit of UA  796 million with 
Japan.  The  Nine in 1972  had a  deficit of UA  1.207 million. 
Japanese-American trade has always been much rrore extensive than 
Japanese-Cormn.mity trade.  In 1955,  for example,  22.7 per cent of Japanese 
exports went to the US  market and only 4. 0  per cent to the market of the 
countries of the Connrunity of Six.  In 1972,  31.1 per cent of Japanese exports 
went to the United States and 7. 7  :per cent to the Comrmmi ty of Six and 11. 5 
per cent to the Nine.  The  same  situation exists for Japanese irrp:>rts:  in 
1955  31. 3  per cent came  from the United States and 3. 8  per cent from the 
Conrron  Market of Six, while in 1972  24.9 per cent came  fran the United States, 
5. 9  per cent from the Six and 8.  4  per cent from the Nine.  The  Japanese have 
clearly concentrated their export interests on the closer and already 
familiar American market with its unified  econo~ with no barriers to trade, 
one language,  and  210 million consurrers vvith just alx>ut the highest: standard 
of living in the world. 21 
There are various reasons for the lower level of Conmuni  ty-Japanese trade 
in canparison to American-Japanese trade.  Perhaps the rrost irrpJrtant is the 
simple factor of distance,  which causes nn.Ich  higher transport costs and 
carrplicates both marketing and after-sales servicing.  The distance between 
Tokyo and San Francisco,  by air, is 8,200 km  (5,095  miles);  the distance 
between Tokyo  and Rotterdam,  also by air  1  is 12,  700  krn  (7 1891  miles) .  This 
natural barrier of crossing twJ oceans rather than only one has limited trade 
between Asia and Europe.  This is true not only for Corrmuni ty cormerce vii th 
Japan but also for that with other Asian nations such as China,  India,  and 
Honq  Kong. 
Another factor which limits trade between Europe. ·.and  Japan is the similar 
structure of export industries in the two areas.  Arrerican-Japanese comrrerce 
is broadly complerrentary  1  with the United States exporting large quanti  ties 
of agricultural products,  raw materials  and high technology products to Japan, 
while the United States irrpJrts rranufactured products,  especially crns1.ll1Er  goods 
and autonobiles from Japan.  Japanese and European industries,  on the 
contrary,  are often specialized and have their cornpeti  ti  ve trade advantage 
in exactly the sarre fields.  The  twJ exrx>rt,  and are cornpeti  tors in,  such 
products as consumer electronics,  chemicals,  traditional capital goods and 
small automobiles.  In America,  for example,  the major competition in such 
fields as small cars and tape recorders comes  not from American products 
but from European products.  When  Japanese-European competition takes place in 
Europe,  the European producer with low or nil transport costs has an obvious 
and irrpJrtant advantage over the product that nn.Ist  be transf:X)rted 12,700 km. - 22 
To  take one inportant example,  autonobiles:  Japan in 1972  e~rted 
an estimated $1.112 billion ~rth of passenger cars to the United s·t:ates,  with 
a  large proportion of these being sold in the geographically closer Pacific 
Coast area.  In the American market one of the major corrpetitors of Japanese 
cars are European exports.  While during the past few years sales of Japanese 
cars have increased rapidly in Europe,  they started fran a  very low base and in 
1972 Camrunity inports from Japan anounted to only $146 million.  Restrictions 
on inporting lJapanese autonobiles into the Camruni  ty,  h<:Mever,  exist: only in 
Italy.  The explanation for the wide difference between Japanese car exp:>rts 
to Europe and the  United States is obviously found in the stronger 
conpeti  tion in Europe in the field of small cars, where European manufactures 
have much  larger experience. 
VII.  TRADE  AND  THE  MJNETARY  SITUATION 
International trade is ultimately dependent upon the srrooth ~rking of the 
international nonetary system.  Yet over the past tv..o  years that system has been 
repeatedly buffeted by crises of confidence in the stability of the system  itself. 
The  European Community  and its Member  States have played a  cooperative and 
constructive role during those recurring crises.  The Member States of the 
Community  have also accepted substantial clevaluations of the us dollar vis-a-vis 
their currencies.  After March  1973 the currencies of six Corrmunity countries11 
have been floating jointly in relation to the dollar.  Since the nonetary crisis 
of May-August  1971 the currencies of Conm.mity :rrerrbers  have been m:x:lified by 
approximately the following am:nmts vis-'a-vis the dollar as of July 1, 1973: 
(+ = revalued,  - = devalued) 
Gerrrany 
Netherlands 
Belqiurrv' 
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
+ 53.7 per cent 
+  40.2 
+ 39.6 
+ 32.2 
France  +  35. 3 per cent 
Italy  +  8.0 
Ireland & Britain  7.6 
llBelgium,  Denrnark,  France,  Genn:my,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands 23  -
These heavy revaluations in relation to the dollar have resulted in a 
C'OITIIercial  handicap for the Corrmuni ty Member States and a  weakening of their 
international competitive position during a  period when a  less favorable 
econanic situation and lc:rwer  economic growth existed in the Ccmnuni ty than in 
the United States. 
Trade is an inlfx:>rtant  element in the balance of payments of any 
COW1try,  but it is not the only factor to be taken into consideration.  And  while 
~ican  officials have stressed the trade aspect of the recent Arrerican balance 
of payments deficit, the Airerican payments acconnt must be examined as a  whole, 
especially in view of its rapidly changing structure.  In the early 1960 • s, 
the United States regularly ran large trade surpluses,  reaching a  peak of 
$6.831 billion in 1964.  During the latter 1960
1s, however,  this trade surplus 
declined,  and the trade acconnt went into deficit in 1971 and 1972.  This 
phenorrenon was  caused by a  variety of factors.  Persistent and high dorrestic 
inflation and very low productivity gains weakened the competitive position of 
American exp:>rts.  The rapid spread of technology aronnd the globe led many 
colll1tries in EuroJ?e  and Asia into fields which had been previously the private 
domain of American industry.  The big increases in American raw naterial 
in'p:>rts,  especially of oil, was another factor. 
In 1965 the United States inlfx:>rted  energy prcxlucts ~rth $2.181 
billion but by 1972 these inlfx:>rts  had increased to $4.814 billion worth.  Lastly, 
as pointe:l out arove in Section IV,  American multinational corp:>rations have 
begu.n  manufacturing abroad rrany prcxlucts which were previously exported from 
the united States. 24 
On the credit side of the balance of payments account invisible 
earnings have becone an increasingly important factor.  The United States has 
developed a  :post-industrial se:rvice econo.n:ry,  with Arrerican finns  inci~easingly 
serving their foreign markets primarily through direct production abroad.  This 
is the pheno:rrenon  that economists call the  "ma.ture"  econOiey,  in which earnings 
fran investrnent and services play an important role in the overall payments situation. 
In recent years the repatriation of profits from Arrerican subsidiaries 
abroad has becane a  :rrajor new  source of revenue.  Remitted income on total 
US  direct investment abroad rose from $2.395 billion in 1960 to $10.293 
billion in 1972.  Ia.st year 2,395 American firms repatriated $1.460 billion 
in profits from investment in the Six and an additional $836 million from 
.Ln.vestment  in the United Kingdom.  Any analysis of the American l-;alance of 
payrrents must take into consideration its changing structure and the importance 
of earnings from US  invest:rrent abroad.  Concentrating on the trade account 
alone results in a  distorted vie"t.v. 
The  turbulent international nonetary scene of the past fetv years can 
only be calmed,  however,  by a  far-reachinsr reform of the international rronetary 
system.  At the Paris Surrmi t  Conference last ~tober, the Cormnmi ty declared 
that the following principles should be the bases for the new  system: 
•  fixed but adjustable parities 
•  general convertibility of currencies 
•  effective international regulation of the world supply of liquidity 
•  reduction in the role of national currencies as reserve instrurtents 
•  effective and equitable functioning of the adjustment process 
•  equal rights and duties for all participants in the system 
•  lessening of the destabilizing effects of short-term capital move~ts 
•  consideration for the interests of the developing countries. - 25 
The Ccmnunity and its Merriber  States have been playing an active role 
in the negotiations for the refonn of the rronetary system with a  view to 
achieving a  successful conclusion without delay.  At the sane t.irrE,  the Conmmi  ty 
does not believe that there should be any forced connection between these 
negotiations and the other talks concerning trade or defense matters.  Such 
connections could delay and complicate the achievement of solutions in all 
these fields.  Concerning this issue, Sir Christopher Soarres  recently said: 
"It would be mistaken to argue,  because these problems are interrelated, that 
they should therefore all be ltmped into one big basket and dealt with together 
in a  single negotiation;  that all issues,  regardless of their intrinsic t.irrE 
scales,  have to be tied up in a  single deadline;  that every solution for any 
one must be conditional on solutions for them all; and that the difficulties 
in any one should block progress in the others.  Certainly all these problems 
call for overall political direction and m:magement.  But to force into a  single 
forum all the diverse questions we  confront,  far from simplifying their solution, 
could corrplicate and exacerbate them. " 
The rronetary and trade negotiations will be seen as a  coherent entity, 
and progress must be made  on both sides at the sane tine.  Efforts in the two 
fields will help to improve  econ~c relations. 
In the introductory section to the docurrent setting out the Comnuni ty'  s 
overall approach to the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations in GATT  it 
is pointed out that the policy of liberalizing '\NOrld  trade carmot be carried 
out successfully "unless parallel efforts are made  to set up a  rronetary system 
which shields the v.K)rld  economy  from the shocks and inbalances" which occurred 
during the first half of 1973.  The Community will assess the progress of the 
GA'IT  negotiations in the light of the progress made  in the rronetary field and 
will take such progress into account both at the beginning and throughout the 
negotiations and when  taking a  decision on their results. - 26  -
VIII.  THE  NE.W  ROUND .  OF  MULTilATERAL  NEGOriATIONS 
This September in Tokyo  a  new  roliD.d  of C:ATI'  mil  tilateral trade negotiations 
began.  This is the seventh round of tariff reductions since GATr  was  founded 
in 1947 and the first since the 1967 conclusion of the Kennedy  Round..  Sir 
Christopher Soarres  outlined the Conmuniyt's broad objectives in these negotiations, 
saying,  "Between the industrialized cotmtries we  nu.st consolidate and continue 
the process of liberalization, and do so on a  reciprocal basis to our mutual 
advantage.  For the less-developed v,;orld we nrust ensure not sirrply that their 
interests are not d.arraged,  but,  on the contrary that they secure greater 
opporttmities for their economic expansion as a  result of what we  do  .. " 
The Conmuni ty in June adopted its overall position on the ne\v multilateral 
ronnd.  The  following is only a  very brief rest:lllE  of the nost importcmt elements 
of that overall position. 
1.  Industrial Tariffs 
The  new  round should lead to a  significant l~ing  of customs tariffs.  The 
formula eventually adopted for lowering customs tariffs nru.st also taJ.:::e  account 
of the considerable disparities which exist arrong national tariffs.  As pointed 
out in Section I  of this background note,  the Connn.mi ty has a  fairly even and 
fairly low tariff.  Other countries such as the United States have m:my  zero 
tariffs but also have nany very high duties.  The Carrmmity has adopi:ed the 
principle that the higher  the tariff the greater should be the reduct:ion rrade 
in it.  It also upheld the notion that there should be a  threshold tariff level 
below which the Corrmuni ty should not insist on any tariff reduction.  One  of 
the advantages of this approach v,;ould  be that the generalized preferences which 
the Comnunity and Japan give to developing countries ~uld renain beneficial 
to them. 27 
2.  Agricultural Trade 
Previous GA'IT rotmds have concentrated mainly on industrial tariffs.  The  new 
round,  thouqh, will also deal with agricultural trade.  Negotiations in this 
field will be much  nore cooplicated than those in industrial products because, 
as Irentioned above,  the nethods of agricultural protection vary narkedly from 
country to country.  The Conm.mity has nade it clear that neither the principles 
nor the nechanisms of the camon agricultural :policy are up for negotiation. 
However,  the Com:nunity is ready to discuss the practical application of the rules 
on a  basis of reciprocity.  The  Com:nunity' s  objective in these negotiations is 
to expand trade in stable world markets while respecting existing agricultural 
policies.  It is hoped that the negotiations will secure multilateral agreenents 
for certain products such as wheat,  flour and feed grains,  rice,  sugar and 
certain honogeneous milk products.  These agreements could include maxinrum  and 
minimum prices,  stockpiling neasures and food aid.  Where  such agreements are 
reached the way  the oonnon agricultural :policy is irrple:rrented will obviously be 
adjusted accordingly. 
3.  Nontariff Barriers 
The  new multilateral round should also :rcake  a  concerted effort to disnantle 
sane of the nontariff hinderances to trade.  The  Comm.mity  feels that the new 
round should take account of this work  and draw up general principles or codes 
of behavior in this field. 
For certain neasures used by only a  few countries ad hoc solutions 
could be reached.  The  Cormrunity will specify the nontariff barriers it wishes 
to see dealt  with in the negotiations and is ready to negotiate in return on 
sorre of the rreasures which the .l\'Ernber  States themselves apply. - 28 
4.  Developing Corm tries 
The  new multilateral ro1md  should in no way undennine the p::>si tion of the 
developing cotmtries.  The  Corrmuni ty and other developed countries,  on the 
contrary,  have already pledged themselves to take particular account of the 
interests of the developing countries during the negotiations.  In a.ddi  tion to 
the world agricultural arrangerrents described al:x:>ve,  rreasures should be considered 
for products of particular interest to developing cotmtries so that they can 
maintain or increase their export revenue.  The  Conmm.i ty also hopes to irrprove 
its system of generalized preferences for developing countries for their exports 
of industrial goods and the inclusion of processed agricultural products in the 
system. 
5.  Safeguard Clause 
As  tariff and nontariff measures are gradually lowered or abolished,.  countries 
nay increasingly feel the need for safeguard clauses to adapt to and overcome 
purely transitory difficulties caused by an inp:lrt influx of certain specific 
goods.  The  Canmunity holds that the present safeguard provisions of Article XIX 
of the GATI'  cxxie  fonn a  good basis and should be ma.intained as they are.  It 
ma.y  however be that certain countries will wish Article XIX  to be supplerrented 
so as to make  it operate rrore effectively,  and the Conmunity is willing to 
enter negotiations to this end.  But whatever changes are made  should not result 
in rrore restrictive safeguards  nor make  safeguards easier to apply or limit the 
right to retaliate, unless the conditions are set down with great precision and 
subject to firm international control. .  . 
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6.  Reciprocity 
The  post-war rrovenent of freer VK.)rld  trade has been firmly based on the 
principle of "reciprocity and mutual advantage."  'lhe practice in trade 
negotiations of mutual concessions in the quest of mutual advantage has led 
to a  general lowering of trade barriers and furthered the prosperity of all 
participating countries.  While it is impOssible  1  of course  1  for the developing 
countries to grant reciprocity  1  the Corrmunity ma.intains that the principle of 
reciprocity must be accepted by all industrialized countries if the new 
:multilateral round is to be successful. 
CONCLUSION 
The  Member  States of the European Corrnnuni ty and the Corrmuni ty itself have 
taken an active part in the post-war rrovenent towards freer \VOrld  trade.  'lhe 
very existence of the Connnmity has been a  stimulus for rrore liberal trade 
in Europe and in the VK.)rld.  The  Dillon Round  and the Kennedy  Round  in GA'IT, 
where the Conmmity played a  ma.jor and constructive role,  took place prirrarily 
because of the establishm::mt and developrrent of the Cormnuni ty.  Following the 
completion of the Kennedy Round tariff cuts, the Comnunity emerged with the 
lowest customs tariff of any rcajor trading entity  1  at a  level only half that 
of the average tariffs of the original Member States. 
During the forthcoming negotiations in GA'IT  and in the International 
M::>netary  Fund and in the areas of future ccx:>peration between the United States 
and the Cormn.mi ty in trade, rronetary refonn1  energy supply  1  defense,  industrial 
relations, or any other field,  the overall political objective of relations 
between Europe and Anerica must be kept clearly in focus.  This note itself 
has often dealt with sorre of the technical details of Atlantic relations.  But 
these technical details  should not lead to an eclipse of the shared cormon 
interest in developing and supporting an international economic  system that 
will further the prosperity not only of the citizens of both Europe and Anerica 
but also that of the whole \VOrld,  nor to an overlooking of the nany interests 
and ideals that Europe and Arrerica have in comrron  far beyond the economic dorrain. 30 
TABLE  I 
TRADE  BALANCE  BETWEEN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND 
THE  UNITED  STATES 
(in millions of units  of account*) 
Ex:Qort  Import  Community  Trade 
US  Dest.  US  Origin  Balance with the  US 
.  . 
(FOB)  (CIF)  (negative = US  surplus) 
1958  1,664  2,808  -1,144 
1959  2,371  2,651  280 
1960  2,242  3,830  -1,588 
1961  2,232  4,054  -1,822 
1962  2,447  4,458  -2,011 
1963  2,563  5 ,0_51  -2,488 
1964  2,849  5,438  -2,589 
1965  3,425  5,693  -2,268 
1966  4,098  6,022  -1,924 
1967  4,424  5,898  -1,474 
1968  5,769  6,393  624 
1969  5,958  7,335  -1,377 
1970  6,634  9,040  -2,406 
1971  7,694  8, 976  -1,282 
1972  (Six)  8,321  8,585  264 
1972  (Nine)  11,713  ,11,.900  187 
*  One  unit  of account  equals  one  1970  dollar. 
Source:  Statistical Office of  the  European  Communities •. 31 
TABLE  II 
I.  BOOK  VALUE  OF  DIRECT  AMERICAN  INVESTMENTS  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  AT  YEAR'S  END 
(in millions of dollars) 
1958  1965  1969  1970  1971 
Germany  666  2,431  4,276  4,597  5,214 
France  546  1,609  2,122  2,590  3,013 
Italy  280  982  1,422  1,550  1,860 
Netherlands  207  686  1,227  1,508  1,672 
Belgium/Luxembourg  208  596  ,.  1,214  1,529  1,815 
Community  Total  (Six)  1,908  6,304  10,255  11,774  13,574 
United Kingdom  2,147  5,123  7,190  7,996  8,941 
Ireland  n.a.  n. a.  n.a.  188*  215* 
Denmark  49  200  309  362  357 
Community  Total  (Nine)  20,320  23,087 
II  ..  BOOK  VALUE  OF  DIRECT  COMMUNITY  INVESTMENTS  I~  THE  UNITED  STATES  AT 
YEAR'S  END 
(in millions of dollars) 
1960  1965  1969  1970  1971 
Germany  103  209  617  680  767 
France  168  200  319  286  315 
Italy  71  87  95  100  109 
Netherlands  947  1,  304  1,966  2,151  2,225 
Belgium/Luxembourg  157  175  309  338  341 
Community  Total  (Six) 
1,446  1,975  3,306  3,555  3,757 
United  Kingdom  2,248  2,852  3,496  4,127  4,435 
Ireland  neg.  neg.  neg.  neg.  neg. 
Denmark  (1959  = 30)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  90* 
Community  Total 
8  282 
Source:  "Survey of  Current  Business"  and  US  Department  of  Connnerce. 
*  =  estimate 
neg.  negligible 
n.a.  =  not  available TABLE  III 
STRUCTURE  OF  THE  OFFICIAL  POSITION  OF  THE  RESERVES  AT  THE  END  OF  1972  OF  THE 
PRINCIPLE  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES 
(in millions of  US  dollars,  units  of  account  (UA)  or special  drawing  rights  (SDR)* 
TOTAL 
UA  or 
SDR 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg  3,565 
2 
Germany  21,453 
France  9,224 
Italy  5,599 
Netherlands  4,407 
Community  of  Six  44,248 
Denmark  787 
United  Kingdom  5,199 
Ireland  1,037 
Europe  of  Nine  51,271 
Norway  1,220 
Canada  5,572 
Switzerland  6,897 
Japan  16,915 
Sweden  1,451 
United  States  12,112 
*1  UA  = 1  SDR  =  $1.08571 
1 
TOTAL  GOLD  VALUE  SDR  VALUE 
DOLLAR~  DOLLARS  PER  DOLLARS 
CENT 
3,870  1,638  42o3  568 
23,292  4,336  18.6  893 
10,015  3,826  38.2  630 
6,079  3,130  51.5  371 
4,785  2,059  43.0  705 
48,041  14,989  31.2  3,167 
854  69 
n  ;  78  o • .L 
5,645  800  14.2  656 
1,126  17  1.5  43 
55,666  15'  87 5  28.5  3,944 
1,325  37  2.8  95 
6,050  834  13.8  505 
7,488  3,158  42.2  -
18,365  801  4.4  461 
1,575  217  13.8  116 
13,150  10,490  79.8  1,960 
Source:  International Monetary  Fund 
2 
German  marks  converted into US  dollars  at  th~ centrRl rate of  $1 
RESERVE  POSITION  FOREIGN  CURRENCY 
PER  IN  I.H. F.  VALUE  DOLlAR  PER  including 
CENT  DOLLARS  PER  CENT  DOLLARS 
r.F.N'T' 
14.7  560  14.5  1,104  28.5 
3.8  1,238  5.2  16,825  72.2  16,113 
6.3  499  5.0  5,060  50.5 
6.1  359  5.9  2,219  36.5 
14.7  601  12.6  1,420  29.7 
6.6  3,257  6.8  26,628  55.4 
9.1  71  8.3  636  74.5 
11.6  126  2.2  4.063  72.0 
3.8  44  3.9  1,022  90.8 
7.1  3,498  6.3  32,349  58.1 
7.2  75  5.6  1,118  84.4 
8.3  343  5.7  4,368  72.2  4,355 
- - - 4,330  57.8 
2.5  620  3.4  16,483  89.7 
t 
7.4  98  6.2  1,144  72.6 
14.9  460  3.5  240  1.8 
3.225  marks  (Bundesbank). 
PER  CENT 
of total 
69.2 
I 
r::::; 
I ~opulation (1,000)  at 
6/30/71 
~NP  (1,000 mil.  UA*)  (1971) 
Imports  (percentage of world 
total)  (1972) 
tExports  (percentage  of world 
total)  (1972) 
[otal cereals  production  (1971) 
(1.000 metric  tons) 
[otal meat  production  (1970) 
(1,000 metric tons) 
~ilk production  (1970) 
(1.000 metric  tons) 
~otal  primary  energy 
production  (1971) 
(1,000  tons  coal 
equivalent) 
~otal domestic  consumption 
of  primary  energy  and 
equivalent  sources 
(million tons  coal 
equivalent)  (1971) 
Total  production of petroleum 
products  (1,  000  metric 
tons)  (1972) 
~otal gross  production  of 
electrical energy  (Gwh) 
(1972) 
Steel production  (1,000 
metric  tons)  (1972) 
:ar production  (private 
and  commercial vehicles) 
(1972) 
~ransport-Railways 
Passenger Kms.  (millions) 
(1971) 
[otal merchant  fleet  on 
July 1,  1971  (1,000  gross 
registered  tons) 
' 
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TABLE  IV 
GENERAL  STATISTICS 
SIX  NINE 
I 
189,638  253,247 
536.2  693.2 
15.0  19.3 
17.3  20.6 
77,0341 
100,6041 
13,735  18,344 
72,448  93,637 
335,856  507,736 
862.2  1,205.4 
428,454  537,3962 
670,300  961,333 
113.147  139 '109 
8,559,000  10,480,000 
127,252  161,645 
4 
61,1365 
30,281 
* 1  UA  = 1  SDR  =  $1.08571 
1  Excluding  rice.  Figures  including rice as  follows: 
2  Excluding  Ireland  77,809  101,379 
3 Provisional  figure 
4 
Excluding  Luxembourg 
5  Excluding  Ireland or Luxembourg 
UNITED 
STATES  USSR  JAPAN 
207,049  245,066  104,606 
1,066.1  - 219.8 
14.7  4.2  6.2 
14.0  4.3  8.0 
232 '3261 
1 
171,601  1,0681 
23,775  10,165  1,373 
53,268  82,900  4,766 
2 '091, 350  1,392,800  70,154 
2,409.4  - 405.2 
- - -
1,974,0003  845,0003  412,0003 
123,770  126,000  96,900 
8,828,000  730,000  4,022,000 
11,167  274,600  190,321 
16,265  16,194  30,509 
235 '382  172,356  12,379 34  -
TABLE  V  (a) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS 
PRINCIPAL  TRADING  PARTNERS 
1958-72  (in millions of dollars) 
'~ 
Imports  (All Products) 
Intra- United  States  Canada  Japan 
Community  r 
1958  6,790  2,808  430  117 
1959  8,082  2,651  327  115 
1960  10,150  3,830  450  163 
1961  1~. '718  4,054  _(485  204 
1962  13,416  4,458  452  257 
1963  15 '7  37  5,051  451  335 
1964  18,054  5,438  500  358 
1965  20,442  5,693  588  454 
1966  22,922  6,022  634  528 
1967  24,173  5,898  641  538 
1968  28,422  6,393  731  653 
1969  36,341  7,335  823  890 
1970  42,824  9,040  1,260  1,233 
1971  49,410  8,984  1,198  1,542 
1972  55,993  8,549  1,088  1,876 
TABLE  V  (b) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS  PRINCIPAL 
TRADING  PARTNERS 
1958-72  (in millions of dollars) 
~ 
Exports  (All Products) 
Intra- United  States  Canada  Japan 
Community  r 
1958  6,864  1,664  237  139 
1959  8,168  2,371  295  167 
1960  10,246  2,242  293  209 
1961  11,893  2,232  308  306 
1962  13,563  2,447  312  307 
1963  1.5,926  2,563  309  358 
1964  18,383  2,849  372  394 
1965  20,822  3,425  480  342 
1966  23,230  4,098  529  412 
1967  24,509  4,424  545  584 
1968  28,914  5,769  611  637 
1969  36,463  5,958  713  740 
1970  43,308  6,634  728  987 
1971  49,616  7,701  941  937 
1972  56,258  8,321  1,021  1,080 
Rest  of 
World 
12,801 
13,113 
15,002 
15,712 
17'  186 
18,840 
20,560 
21,847 
23,5  72 
23,818 
25,790 
30,205 
34,105 
37,475 
41,013 
Rest  of 
·world 
13,870 
14,217 
16,739 
17 ,592 
17,570 
.18,399 
:20,564 
22,846 
24,380 
26,076 
28,275 
31,817 
36,853 
~+1, 191 
1l6 ,259 35  -
TABLE  V  (c) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS 
PRINCIPAL  TRADING  PARTNERS 
1958-71  (in millions of dollars) 
~· 
Imports  (Industrial Products) 
y  Intra- United  States  Canada 
Connnunity 
1958  5,544  1,919  255 
1959  6,536  1,751  177 
1960  8,365  2,632  279 
1961  9' 751  2,770  291 
1962  11,195  3,159  255 
1963  13,240  3,693  253 
1964  15,224  3,811  299 
1965  17,098  3,971  353 
1966  19,311  4,135  379 
1967  20,324  4,274  421 
1968  23,865  4, 759  543 
~969  30,541  5,736  617 
~970  36,326  7,058  934 
~971  41,619  6, 821  790 
TABLE  V(d) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS 
PRINCIPAL  TRADING  PARTNERS 
Japan 
77 
74 
96 
140 
180 
246 
273 
368 
451 
459 
566 
809 
~,138 
tL,429 
1958-71  (in millions of dollars) 
~on 
Exports  (Industrial Products) 
Intra- United  States  Canada  Japan 
Community 
1958  5,651  1,459  210  120 
1959  6,642  2,146  266  152 
1960  8,471  2,007  264  203 
1961  9,928  1,991  281  287 
1962  11,363  2,197  281  287 
1963  13,439  2,302  279  332 
1964  15,597  2,578  337  366 
1965  17,474  3,134  343  310 
1966  19,657  3,772  484  371 
1967  20,626  4,077  497  529 
1968  24,298  5,388  562  569 
1969  30,637  5,577  654  663 
1970  36,777  6,197  665  902 
1971  41,832  7,251  859  861 
Rest  of 
World 
6,549 
6,825 
8,177 
9,003 
9,835 
11,047 
12' 321 
13,323 
14,589 
15,233 
17,357 
20,613 
23,993 
2 7'  132 
Rest  of 
World 
12,200 
12,585 
14,920 
15,646 
15,621 
16,252 
18,251 
20,382 
21,064 
23,628 
24,738 
29,158 
33,754 
37,665 - 36  -
TABLE  V  (e) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS 
PRINCIPAL  TRADING  PARTNERS 
1958-71  (in millions  of dollars) 
~ 
Imports  (Agricultural Products) 
Intra- United  States  Canada 
Community  IY~ 
ll958  1,246  889  175 
tl959  1,546  900  150 
[960  1,785  1,198  171 
a.961  1,967  1,284  194 
a.962  2,221  1,299  197 
0..963  2,497  1,358  198 
a.964  2,830  1,627  201 
tl965  3,344  1,722  235 
a.966  3,611  1,887  255 
tl967  3,849  1,624  220 
tl968  4,557  1,634  188 
b.969  5,800  1,599  206 
ll970  6,498  1,982  326 
b-971  7,791  2,163  408 
TABLE  V (f) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS 
PRINCIPAL  TRADING  PARTNERS 
Japan 
40 
41 
67 
64 
77 
89 
85 
86 
77 
79 
87 
81 
95 
113 
1958-71  (in millions of dollars) 
~tion  Exports  (Agricultural Products) 
Intra- United  States  Canada  Japan 
r  Community 
1958  1,213  205  27  19 
1959  1,526  225  29  15 
1960  1,775  235  29  16 
1961  1,965  241  27  19 
1962  2,200  250  31  20 
1963  2,487  261  30  26 
1964  2,786  271  35  28 
1965  3,348  291  37  32 
1966  3,57  3  326  45  41 
1967  3,883  347  48  55 
1968  4,616  381  49  68 
1969  5,826  381  59  77 
1970  6,531  437  63  85 
1971  7, 784  450  82  76 
'  I 
Rest  of 
World 
6,252 
6,288 
6,825 
6,709 
7 '351 
7,793 
8,239 
8,524 
8,983 
8,585 
8,433 
9,592 
10,112 
10,343 
Rest  of 
World 
1,670 
1,632 
1,819 
1,  936 
1,949 
2,147 
2,313 
2,464 
2,416 
2,448 
3,537 
2,659 
3,099 
3,526 • 
• 
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TABLE  V  (g) 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  (SIX)  AND  ITS 
PRINCIPAL  TRADING  PARTNERS 
1958-72  (in millions  of dollars) 
United  States! 
Trade  Bal~nce 
Canada  Japan 
1958  -1,144  -193  22 
1959  -280  -32  52 
1960  -1,588  -157  46 
1961  -1,822  -177  102 
1962  -2,011  -140  50 
1963  -2,488  -142  23 
1964  -2,589  -128  36 
1965  -2,268  -108  -112 
1966  -1,924  -105  -116 
1967  -1,474  -96  46 
1968  -624  -120  -16 
~969  -1,377  -110  -150 
1970  -2,406  -532  -246 
1971  -1,283  -257  -605 
~972  -228  -67  -796 
- '---~~-~- -~-~==·---"·-
Rest  of World 
1,069 
1,104 
1,737 
1,870 
384 
-441 
4 
999 
808 
2,258 
2,485 
1p12 
2,748 
3,716 
5,246 
-- ----·--·-
~....-::~~--